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Abstract
The paper addresses the issue of air pollution in the European Union (EU). The focus is
on economic and environmental assessment of alternative pollution control scenarios. In
order to derive policy-relevant conclusions, we develop an ecology-economy model of the
EU by linking an environmental eﬀect from countries’ SO2 (sulphur dioxide) abatement
with their economic outcomes.
We consider SO2 reduction strategies (GAINS) available for the EU member states
during 2015-2020 and, compare environmental and economic impacts in two scenarios as-
suming that a base-line abatement technology and respectively, an advanced abatement
technology are being used. Furthermore, we introduce elements of game theory and con-
sider a possibility for cooperation in air pollution abatement among several Baltic countries
(Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Latvia). The optimal choice of the technologies and cor-
responding levels of SO2 reduction are determined for the given countries. The coalition
scenario is shown to be superior to the baseline scenario. We study a positive externality
eﬀect and demonstrate that the neighboring countries, Estonia and Lithuania, receive the
highest impact from pollution reduction. Possible free-riding by Latvia and Finland is
considered. It has been proven that stability of cooperation is achievable.
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Business-as-usual, High Technology and Coalition
Scenarios for Transboundary Pollution in the
European Union
Yulia Pavlova (yulia.pavlova@mtt.fi)
1 Introduction
Stationary emissions sources, such as coal-ﬁred and oil-ﬁred power stations, and mobile
sources, such as cars, ships and aircraft emit a complex mixture of pollutants, including
sulphur dioxide SO2 and nitrogen oxides NOx (the precursors to acid rain). It is now
well established that this air pollution is transported over hundreds or even thousands
of kilometres. Consequently, when acidic pollution is ﬁnally deposited, its environmental
impacts are felt in areas far removed from their sources.
In Europe acid rain became a major transboundary enviromental issue in the late
twentieth century. Since the prevailing wind direction there is generally westerly or south-
westerly, territories most aﬀected by acidiﬁcation are Scandinavia, Central and Eastern
Europe. To cope with the transboundary air pollution problem, international treaties
on a long range transport of atmospheric pollutants have been agreed, e.g., the Sulphur
Emissions Reduction Protocol under the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air
Pollution. In collaboration with the UN Economic Commission for Europe and in the
context of the Geneva Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, an in-
teractive model for air pollution and greenhouse gases (GAINS) has been developed at
the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), [1], [2]. This model
explores synergies and trade-oﬀs between control of local and regional air pollution and
mitigation of global greenhouse gas emissions. Its European implementation covers 43
countries in Europe including the European part of Russia. GAINS estimates emissions,
mitigation potentials and costs for six air pollutants (SO2, NOx, NH3, etc.) and for the
six greenhouse gases have been included in the Kyoto protocol. The model time coverage
for scenario analysis is the period 1980–2030.
Over the past 50 years game-theory applications in environmental economics have
largely focused on transboundary pollution problems, [3] – [6]. One of the ﬁrst attempts
to estimate actual spillovers from transboundary pollution was undertaken by [7] for the
case of acid rain in Europe. The following examples of game-theoretic assessment [8] –
[16] show that, as well as global warming and ozone depletion, problem of transboundary
acid rain remains relevant, [17]. Important topics vary from analysis of energy scenarios
and pollution control costs to estimation of transboundary acidiﬁcation and its impact on
ecology and health. Special attention is paid to negotiation and enforcement mechanisms
of multilateral agreements.
The main research interest of the present paper is to derive new policy-relevant conclu-
sions about available pollution control strategies. The goal is achieved by stepwise solving
of 4 tasks:
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• quantiﬁcation of the geo-physical impact of acidiﬁcation;
• calibration of the technology cost and environmental beneﬁt functions associated
with the establishing of an ecology-economy model in use;
• formation of a project of an agreement on acid rain in a group of the EU countries;
• economic and environmental assessment of alternative strategic scenarios for the EU
member states.
Sections 2 and 3 suggest a method to compare two dissimilar facets of environmental
beneﬁts from pollution reduction and monetary costs, which is still missing in the current
load of game-theoretic literature on international environmental agreements (IEAs). We
specify an environmental eﬀect from the countries’ SO2 reduction and then link it with
the monetary payoﬀs by introducing cost/beneﬁt ratios. Thus it allows us to resolve a
crucial problem of consistency in dimension and design an economy-ecology model of the
EU (basing on GAINS data about technology levels available for the EU state members
and the air pollutant transportation coeﬃcient matrix for 2020). In the framework of the
introduced model we undertake a comparative analysis of environmental and economic
aspects of a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario and a high technology (HighT) scenario for
the period 2015-2020. See Section 4.
Further on, in Section 5 we introduce elements of game theory and consider a possi-
bility for cooperation on air pollution reduction among several Baltic countries (Finland,
Sweden, Denmark and Latvia) in the period 2015-2020. The choice of technologies and
correspondent levels of SO2 reduction, optimal for the considered group of countries, are
determined and the coalition is shown to be superior to the baseline scenario in both
environmental and economic aspects. Besides that, we study a positive externality eﬀect
and demonstrate that two neighboring countries, Estonia and Lithuania, receive the high-
est impact from pollution reduction. We reveal that the stability of the agreement can be
threatened by free-riding incentives of Latvia and Finland. We use the concept of potential
internal stability and consider a possibility to introduce a launch transfer mechanism to
eliminate free-riding. Analytic solutions are accompanied by numerical analysis presented
in ﬁgures and tables.
The paper intends to contribute to the initiative on the Fragility of Critical Infrastruc-
tures (www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/FCI).
2 Ecology-Economy Model
Consider N heterogeneous interdependent countries acting as players. Each player can
choose a feasible strategy qi ∈ [qi, q¯i], i = 1, . . . , N , describing the size of a pollution
reduction load (q
i
and q¯i are lower and upper bounds, respectively). Let q = (q1, . . . , qN)
be a full pollution reduction vector. Then the payoﬀ (net beneﬁt) of each player i is given
by
pii(q) = Bi(q)−Ci(qi), (1)
here Bi(q) is a monetary equivalent of the environmental beneﬁt and Ci(qi) is the cost paid
by player i for pollution reduction. Assume that the abatement cost function is quadratic:
Ci(qi) =
1
2
ciq
2
i , (2)
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the parameter ci > 0 is the slope of the marginal cost function. The monetary equivalent
of the environmental beneﬁt gained by player i is given by
Bi(q) = λi
N∑
k=1
Tkiqk, (3)
where
∑N
k=1 Tkiqk is the environmental beneﬁt of the total pollution reduction load to the
territory of player i, Tki   0 is a transport coeﬃcient describing the acidiﬁcation eﬀect
from a proportion of pollution of country k transported to country i.
To assign a monetary value to the environmental beneﬁt, we introduce a parameter
λi   0, i = 1 . . . , N , describing a cost/beneﬁt ratio for each player i, i = 1, . . . , N . The
latter value can be described as a ratio of a unit change in the abatement cost function to
the corresponding increment of the environmental beneﬁt:
λi = xi
(1/2)ciq
2
i∑N
k=1 Tkiqk
= xi
1∑N
k=1 Tki
√
2/ck
. (4)
Parameters xi act as proportionality coeﬃcients, and can be roughly estimated as xi ∈
[3, 20], ci = 1, . . . , N. In the following section we justify a choice of the introduced beneﬁt
and cost functions and further undertake a comparison of the baseline (or business-as-
usual (BAU)) and high technology (HighT)) scenarios for the EU in the period 2015-2020,
using GAINS model data.
3 Model Calibration
In this section we undertake calibration of the suggested ecology-economy model in such
a way that policy-relevant conclusions about optimal pollution control can be derived.
Focusing on the economic aspects of pollution control, we quantify the geo-physical impact
of acidiﬁcation and assign it a monetary value. To carry on the numerical analysis we use
data of the GAINS model, which was developed at the International Institute for Applied
System Analysis (IIASA). It estimates emissions, mitigation potentials and costs for six air
pollutants (SO2, NOx, PM, NH3, VOC) and for the six greenhouse gases included in the
Kyoto protocol. GAINS European implementation covers 43 countries in Europe including
the European part of Russia. In the present paper we tackle air pollutants, in particular
SO2, emitted and deposited on the territory of the EU: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech
and Slovakia Republics, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, UK, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, Poland,
Portugal, Sweden, Slovenia.
3.1 Cost functions and cost/benefit parameters
To determine correlating parameters λi, i = 1, . . . , N , we ﬁrst approximate cost curves of
each of 25 countries. Consider such pollutant as SO2, which together with NH3 and NOx
cause acidiﬁcation of soil. Values eSO2i , e
NOx
i and e
NH3
i denote correspondent pollutants
emitted by player i, i = 1, . . . , N , and then transported around the country and its neigh-
bors’ territory. Level of each emitted pollutant is linked to a certain choice of technology.
Data containing costs of available technologies {cpi }
Ti
p=1 and correspondent pollution levels
{epi }
Ti
p=1, i = 1, . . . , N , in 2020 can be found in the GAINS model. To approximate the
SO2 abatement cost functions, we translate and mirror the pollution cost curves provided
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by GAINS (the original curve is the blue one in Fig. 1 and the transformed one is the red
one in Fig. 2):
qpi = e
BAU
i − e
p
i , p = 1, . . . , Ti,
Ci(q
p
i ) = C
p
i − C
BAU
i , p = 1, . . . , Ti.
As you can see from Fig. 2, the curve describing relation between SO2 reduction and the
costs is concave1 and can be approximated with the quadratic polynom: Ci(qi) =
1
2
ciq
2
i .
We apply the least square method to determine relation of SO2 reduction qi and the
correspondent costs Ci(qi) bared by countries i = 1, . . . , N . Thus parameters ci can be
found as a solution of the problem:
min
ci
Ti∑
p=1
(
1
2
ci(q
p
i )
2 − Ci(q
p
i )
)
2
, i = 1, . . . , N. (5)
In case of Finland, the minimization problem (5) is represented as follows
min
cFin
(
(0.106cFin− 0.25)
2+ (0.328cFin− 0.45)
2+ (4.651cFin− 1.8)
2
+ (8.364cFin− 3.05)
2+ (24.151cFin− 6.63)
2+ (26.064cFin− 7.03)
2
+ (28.956cFin− 8.15)
2+ (38.281cFin− 12.28)
2+ (51.613cFin− 17.76)
2
+ (91.937cFin− 33.1)
2+ (94.119cFin− 33.94)
2+ (106.434cFin− 39.78)
2
+(117.505cFin− 63.51)
2
)
,
and leads to cFin = 0.409 (Fig. 3 represents thus obtained SO2 abatement cost curve of
Finland, it is marked in green).
Figure 1: Technology cost curve of Finland in 2020
1This property holds for all 25 EU countries
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Figure 2: SO2 reduction cost curve of Finland in 2020
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Figure 3: Approximation of the SO2 reduction cost function of Finland in 2020
Table 1: Slopes of abatement cost curves of 25 EU countries
country Austria Belgium Cyprus Czech Rep. Germany
ci 1.24 0.099 1.058 0.21 0.061
country Denmark Estonia Spain Finland France
ci 1.556 0.52 0.011 0.409 0.018
country UK Greece Hungary Ireland Italy
ci 0.028 0.039 0.028 0.472 0.014
country Lithuania Luxembourg Latvia Malta Netherlands
ci 0.091 4.862 0.354 3.698 0.143
country Poland Portugal Sweden Slovenia Slovakia Rep.
ci 0.005 0.043 1.321 0.155 0.167
Following the least square method (5) we determine slopes of abatement cost curves
of all 25 EU countries, see Tab. 1. Fig. 4 present the transposed matrix of SO2 transport
coeﬃcients2, where each element Tik of row i speciﬁes acidiﬁcation impact, caused by the
fraction of the correspondent type of pollution ek of region k being deposited in region i.
Given the parameters ci and Tki we can now determine correlating cost/beneﬁt parameters
λi (Tab. 2).
2GAINS extrapolations for 2020
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Table 2: Cost/beneﬁt parameters λi of 25 EU countries
country Austria Belgium Cyprus Czech Rep. Germany
λi 9.229 2.049 2389.139 4.033 4.094
country Denmark Estonia Spain Finland France
λi 15.015 77.385 44.246 96.71 7.946
country UK Greece Hungary Ireland Italy
λi 12.16 58.795 14.758 13.548 22.66
country Lithuania Luxembourg Latvia Malta Netherlands
λi 26.081 5.196 43.283 0.8 1.137
country Poland Portugal Sweden Slovenia Slovakia Rep.
λi 4.182 43.286 34.687 21.494 9.839
3.2 Benefit function
Assume the environmental damage, caused by these pollutants, is described as a sum of
deposition impacts (GAINS):
Denvi (e
SO2 , eNOx, eNH3) =
N∑
k=1
(
TSO2ki e
SO2
k + T
NOx
ki e
NOx
k + T
NH3
ki e
NH3
k
)
+ κi, i = 1, . . . , N.
(6)
Pollutant loads eSO2k , e
NOx
k and e
NH3
k measured in kilotons (Kt), parameter κi is back-
ground deposition impact (it reﬂects pollution ﬂow from the area outside of the considered
European territory), measured in3 mEq(H+)/hectar/year. The transport coeﬃcients
TSO2ki , T
NOx
ki and T
NH3
ki are measured as mEq(H+)/hectar/year/Kt, and the environ-
mental damage Denvi (Ei) has dimension mEq(H+)/hectar/year.
Let qi = e
SO2,Y
i − e
SO2,X
i , i = 1, . . . , N , denote players’ strategies, describing SO2
reduction during period [Y,X ] (from moment Y to moment X). We shall specify the
beneﬁt functions Bi(q), i = 1, . . . , N , from reduction of pollution loads q, using given in
GAINS environmental damage functions Denvi (e
SO2, eNOx, eNH3), i = 1, . . . , N , (6):
Bi(q) = λi(D
env
i (e
SO2,X , eNOx,X , eNH3,X)−Denvi (e
SO2,X , eNOx,X , eNH3,X))
= λi
∑N
k=1
(
TSO2ki e
SO2,X
k + T
NOx
ki e
NOx,X
k + T
NH3
ki e
NH3,X
k
)
+ λiκi
−λi
∑N
k=1
(
TSO2ki e
SO2,Y
k + T
NOx
ki e
NOx,X
k + T
NH3
ki e
NH3,X
k
)
− λiκi
= λi
∑N
k=1 T
SO2
ki
(
eSO2,Xk − e
SO2,Y
k
)
= λi
∑N
k=1 T
SO2
ki qk.
We shall further omit upper index SO2, thus obtaining identical to (3) representation
Bi(q) = λi
N∑
k=1
Tkiqk, i, k = 1, . . . , 25.
The SO2 abatement beneﬁt is calculated over the cost/beneﬁt parameters given in Tab.
2, and the transfer coeﬃcients given in Fig. 4.
3The dimension is milliequivalents of acid per hectar, per kiloton of pollutant, per year.
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Figure 4: Transport matrix Tki, i, k = 1, . . . , 25 of EU in 2020
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4 Business-as-usual and High Technology scenarios
Let us consider period 2015-2020 and calculate and compare the environmental and eco-
nomic outcomes of two ’opposing’ scenarios. According to the ﬁrst one, Business-As-Usual
scenario (BAU), the EU countries choose the least expensive of available technologies
(base-line level), which is associated with highest SO2 emission. Currently, the EU mem-
ber states are following this scenario. The second scenario is High Technology (HighT),
which would, if adopted, prescribe high technological standards and low pollution. Let us
ﬁrst consider BAU scenario. In the second and third columns of Tab. 3 we summarize
GAINS extrapolations of SO2 pollution reduction qi and pollution control costs Ci(qi) of 25
EU member states4 Using model equations (1) – (4) calibrated in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, we
calculate the beneﬁts Bi(q) and the payoﬀs pii(q) of the EU countries during 2015–2020.
Results of the calculations are presented in Tab. 3. Graphical illustration of abatement
eﬀorts and associated payoﬀs is exhibited in Fig. 5 and 6, respectively. Fig. 5 shows that
the largest SO2 abatement in BAU scenario is undertaken by Poland, United Kingdom
and Spain.
Poland provides a good example of the transboundary eﬀect of air pollution: Being one
of the largest pollutant together with Italy, France, Spain and Germany, Poland undertakes
highest reduction of SO2 during 2015-2020, making a substantial positive impact on the
neighboring countries Czech and Slovakia republics and Lithuania (see Fig. 6). Another
example of positive externality is Finland, Denmark and Sweden, who also beneﬁt by SO2
reductions undertaken by Germany and Poland.
It is interesting to notice that some countries, like Netherlands, Belgium and Portugal,
receive negative payoﬀs. In BAU scenario during 2015–2020 Netherlands lowers costs of
pollution control and increases SO2 production. Air pollution spreads across Netherlands
border and leads to environmental losses on both Netherlands and Belgium’s territories,
thus resulting in negative payoﬀs for both countries. Portugal, due to its geographical
location on oceanside in the south-west of the EU, is exposed to transboundary pollution
threat to much smaller degree than other EU members and it would be better oﬀ by
abating smaller amount of SO2 or not abating at all.
Now let us turn to the HighT scenario during 2015-2020: SO2 reduction and costs of
25 EU member states can be found in the second and third columns of Tab. 4. Using
model equations (1)–(4), we calculate the beneﬁts and the payoﬀs of the EU countries
during 2015–2020 in high technology scenario (see the forth and ﬁfth columns in Tab. 4).
Fig. 7 and 8 represent comparison of abatement eﬀorts (Kt) and the payoﬀs (Mln. E) of
the 25 EU countries during 2015–2020 in the BAU and HighT scenarios. Though majority
of the countries are better oﬀ in the HighT scenario, it would be premature to conclude
its superiority over the BAU scenario since its enforcement needs to be guaranteed by all
25 EU countries. As we can see from Fig. 8, the HighT costs of such countries as Poland,
Germany, Spain, France, Italy (these are the largest pollutants), as well as Greece and
Portugal, are substantially larger than beneﬁts, which makes this scenario unproﬁtable to
those 7 countries and thus can hardly be accepted. In the following section we are going
to suggest alternative scenario based on partial cooperation among EU countries, which
ﬁlls the gap between the BAU and the HighT scenarios, delivering higher abatement levels
and acceptable economic outcomes.
4Pollution characteristics of Malta, Greece and Cyprus can be inaccurate due to complexity of mea-
surements justification. Acidification impact of these countries is rather small and can be omitted.
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Table 3: BAU scenario: SO2 reduction (Kt) and payoﬀs (Mln. E) of EU member states
during 2020-2015
countries GAINS GAINS Estimation (BAU) Estimation (BAU)
SO2 Reduction Cost Beneﬁt Payoﬀ
Kt Mln. E Mln. E Mln. E
Austria 1.241 2.652 83.368 80.716
Belgium 2.296 11.325 8.087 −3.238
Cyprus 7.001 7.845 16.080 8.235
Czech Rep. 14.409 −41.023 99.099 140.122
Germany 16.479 −17.867 54.979 72.846
Denmark 2.855 −26.889 89.235 116.124
Estonia 3.226 −4.455 91.617 96.072
Spain 33.243 23.529 27.932 4.403
Finland −1.333 14.42 87.184 72.764
France 11.108 −45.649 23.307 68.956
UK 62.206 1.237 76.226 74.989
Greece 24.381 23.347 21.289 −2.058
Hungary 15.373 2.403 104.849 102.446
Ireland 4.83 7.04 59.445 52.405
Italy 19.501 −21.81 20.543 42.353
Lithuania 4.556 2.307 118.951 116.644
Luxembourg −0.002 4.728 38.342 33.614
Latvia 1.62 −1.097 108.838 109.935
Malta 7.959 0.88 0.257 −0.623
Netherlands −3.066 34.2 −5.449 −39.649
Poland 160.465 −0.783 147.684 148.467
Portugal 3.394 32.987 9.626 −23.361
Sweden 1.686 −17.566 89.186 106.752
Slovenia 3.187 −14.335 91.982 106.317
Slovakia Rep. 5.128 15.515 103.179 87.664
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Figure 5: BAU: SO2 reduction of EU member states during 2020-2015, Kt
Figure 6: BAU: payoﬀ of EU member states during 2020-2015, Mln. E
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Table 4: HighT: SO2 reduction (Kt) and payoﬀ (Mln. E) of EU member states during
2020–2015.
Countries GAINS GAINS Estimation (HighT) Estimation (HighT)
SO2 Reduction Cost Beneﬁt Payoﬀ
Kt Mln. E Mln. E Mln. E
AUST 5.729 15.492 320.041 304.549
BELG 34.939 79.515 165.826 86.311
CYPR 12.266 27.902 61.749 33.847
CZRE 41.361 71.853 354.826 282.973
GERM 128.497 546.406 330.687 −215.719
DENM 6.996 −12.116 365.176 377.292
ESTO 9.729 9.357 354.708 345.351
SPAI 213.142 293.865 168.011 −125.854
FINL 14.002 77.929 334.283 256.354
FRAN 207.341 428.951 206.529 −222.422
UNKI 155.59 158.774 284.312 125.538
GREE 93.994 167.819 79.000 −88.819
HUNG 84.498 45.516 372.176 326.660
IREL 13.516 32.793 195.409 162.616
ITAL 187.399 252.406 103.979 −148.427
LITH 21.055 18.738 423.732 404.994
LUXE 1.298 9.537 293.423 283.886
LATV 7.055 6.717 390.031 383.314
MALT 9.331 7.406 1.173 −6.233
NETH 18.85 77.569 134.733 57.164
POLA 547.696 561.236 511.346 −49.890
PORT 50.907 106.986 57.019 −49.967
SWED 12.674 67.029 352.655 285.626
SLOV 13.517 −2.303 334.710 337.013
SKRE 25.357 67.599 368.285 300.686
–13 –
Figure 7: Comparison of BAU and HighT: SO2 reduction of EU member states during
2020-2015, Kt
Figure 8: Comparison of BAU and HighT: payoﬀ of EU member states during 2020-2015,
Mln. E
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5 Business-as-usual and Coalition scenario
In this section we are going to introduce elements of non-cooperative game theory and
suggest another strategical scenario of SO2 reduction in the EU. Let N = be a set of N
heterogeneous players, e.g. countries, each of which follows its BAU scenario and emits
pollutant that damages a shared environmental resource. We suppose that players de-
cide on additional pollution reduction eﬀorts qSi ∈ Ωi = [0, q¯i], q¯i > 0, being aware of
the transboundary eﬀect of pollution and knowing that reduction achieved by one player
beneﬁts all players. Let vector (1, . . . , s) denote players, which joined the agreement (sig-
natories of the coalition S) and act cooperatively to reduce pollution. Vector (s+1, . . . , N)
describes players, who prefer to act independently (free-riders form set F = N \ S) and
follow BAU scenario. Within the suggested framework we interpret multilateral agree-
ment formation as a static game Γ(S) = 〈N , {qSi }i∈S, {pi
S
i (q
S), piFj (q
S)}i∈S,j∈F 〉, where
qSi is strategy (additional abatement eﬀort) of a player i, i = 1, . . . , N ; q
S is a vector
of strategies of all players given that the agreement is presented by the coalition S, and
piSi (q
S) and piFj (q
S) are the payoﬀs of the signatories and free-riders, respectively, [19],
[20]. We call vector qS feasible if qSi ∈ Ωi, i = 1, . . . , N .
The payoﬀ of each signatory depends on its own abatement decision as well as on
the correspondent decisions of others and can be given as diﬀerence between pollution
reduction beneﬁt and abatement cost
piSi (q
S) = Bi(q
S)−Ci(q
S
i ), i = 1, . . . , s. (7)
Following the BAU scenario, free-riders bare no extra abatement cost (qSj = 0, j = s+1, N )
and their payoﬀs are
piFj (q
S) = Bj(q
S), j = s+ 1, . . . , N.
The beneﬁt and cost functions are such that
B′i ≥ 0, B
′′
i ≥ 0, Bi(0) = 0, (8)
C′i ≥ 0, C
′′
i ≥ 0, Ci(0) = 0. (9)
Properties (8) and (9) of the beneﬁt and cost functions guarantees existence and uniqueness
of maximum of payoﬀs piSi (q) (7), where q
S ∈ Ω =
∏N
i=1 Ωi.
Typical set up for Γ(S) is a two stage game. In the ﬁrst stage players decide (here,
simultaneously) whether to participate in an agreement or not. It is assumed that this is
binary choice: ’join’ and ’do not join’. In the second stage players choose their pollution
reduction level. The problem is solved backwards. Suppose members of the coalition S
choose abatement targets according to the group optimality principle:
max
qS
i
∑
i∈S
piSi (q
S), i ∈ S, (10)
w.r.t. 0  qSi  q¯i. (11)
To characterize the coalition S, we apply the concept of internal and external stability,
also known as self-enforcing, [18]. It says that the coalition S, characterized by vector
(1, . . . , s) of signatories, is self-enforcing if it is internally stable
piFi (q
S\i) ≤ piSi (q
S), i ∈ S, (12)
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and externally stable
piSj (q
S∪i) ≤ piFj (q
S), j ∈ F. (13)
Inequality (12) sets condition of internal stability, i.e. no member of S prefers to withdraw
from the agreement (thus its payoﬀ of a free-rider reduces given the coalition S \ i). This
phenomena occurs because the players, remaining in the coalition, rationally react on
free-riding of the former signatory and recalculate their optimal strategies. As a result the
payoﬀ of the free-rider can become smaller than it was when the player was a signatory.
Foreseeing the following (indirect) punishment from other coalition members, none of
the signatories withdraws. Similarly, condition (13) of external stability guarantees that
no free-rider from set F prefers to join the coalition S (thus becoming a member of the
coalition S∪i the player receives smaller payoﬀ). Together conditions (12) and (13) ensure
that no player unilaterally deviates.
The coalition stability concept receives the following extension by introducing a sharing
rule (or side payments within the coalition), [21], [22]. Let ΔS, where
ΔS =
∑
i∈S
ΔSi =
∑
i∈S
(
piSi (q
S)− piFi (q
S\i)
)
, (14)
be the surplus, obtained by the members of the coalitionS. Applying a certain sharing rule,
ΔS can be reallocated among signatories with certain weights coeﬃcients αi,
∑
i∈S αi = 1,
so that the payoﬀ of each coalition member becomes
σSi (q
S) = piFi (q
S\i) + αiΔ
S. (15)
Formula (15) means that each signatory receives as much as it could get unilaterally
deviating from S, plus individual share of the common surplus. The coalition S is thus
called potentially self-enforcing if
ΔS ≥ 0,
and
piSj (q
S∪i) ≤ piFj (q
S), j ∈ F.
Suppose such Baltic countries as Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Latvia start cooper-
ation towards additional reduction SO2 pollution. It implies that the coalition S consists
of 4 players and the rest of 21 players are free-riders from set F . The payoﬀs of the
signatories are as follows:
(1) Denmark
piS
1
(qS) = 15.015(0.1132qS
1
+ 0.0004qS
2
+ 0.0003qS
3
+ 0.0289qS
4
)− 0.778(qS
1
)2,
(2) Finland
piS
2
(qS) = 96.71(0.0005qS
1
+ 0.0047qS
2
+ 0.0005qS
3
+ 0.005qS
4
)− 0.205(qS
2
)2,
(3) Latvia
piS
3
(qS) = 43.283(0.0012qS
1
+ 0.0006qS
2
+ 0.0044qS
3
+ 0.0049qS
4
)− 0.177(qS
3
)2,
(4) Sweden
piS
4
(qS) = 434.687(0.0073qS
1
+ 0.001qS
2
+ 0.0003qS
3
+ 0.0482qS
4
)− 0.661(qS
4
)2.
When deciding on SO2 reduction strategies, each signatory faces technological limitations:
they can choose one of the available level of technology from BAU to HighT. This limitation
also outlines feasible strategy sets Ωi. The upper bound is q¯i = q
HighT
i , i = 1, . . . , 4
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(according to GAINS). Thus Ω1 = [0, 6.996], Ω2 = [0, 14.002], Ω3 = [0, 7.055], Ω4 =
[0, 12.674]. To determine equilibrium strategies qSi , i = 1, . . . , 4, we solve the problem
(10):
max
qS
1
,qS
2
,qS
3
,qS
4
(
4.973qS
1
+ 0.921qS
2
+ 0.374qS
3
+ 22.082qS
4
−0.778(qS1 )
2 − 0.205(qS2 )
2 − 0.177(qS3 )
2 − 0.661(qS4 )
2
)
,
w.r.t.
0  qS
1
 6.996,
0  qS
2
 14.002,
0  qS
3
 7.055,
0  qS
4
 12.674.
System (5) can be solved using quadratic programming method, Tab. 5. We remind that
strategies qSi describe additional to the BAU reduction of SO2, hence total SO2 abatement
of the signatories in coalition scenario is equal to qCoali = q
BAU
i + q
S
i . In Fig. 9 we present
comparison of SO2 reduction in the BAU, HighT and Coalition scenarios. As we expect,
optimal SO2 reduction of coalition scenario ﬁlls the gap between BAU and HighT scenarios
and thus prescribes choice of higher than BAU technology level (TL) for all 4 countries:
Denmark – TL 2/3 (of 13 available), Latvia – TL 4/5 (of 16 available), Finland – TL 3/4
(of 14 available), Sweden – TL 2/3 (of 12 available).
The Coalition scenario is practicable only if stability of the coalition S is guaranteed.
Let us explore free-riding incentives of the coalition members. According to deﬁnition
of a self-enfocing coalition, it is necessary to consider coalitions S \ i, i = 1, . . . , 4, and
compare payoﬀs of the players if they leave the coalition S with their payoﬀs if they remain
signatories of S (see formula (12)). In a similar manner as for the coalition S we ﬁnd group
optimum qS\i, i = 1, . . . , 4. Tab. 6 presents abatement strategies of Denmark, Finland,
Latvia and Sweden given 5 diﬀerent coalitions:
Table 5: Coalition scenario: additional SO2 pollution reduction (Kt) during 2020-2015
player strategy
Denmark qS
1
= 0.7
Finland qS
2
= 2.123
Latvia qS
3
= 1.282
Sweden qS
4
= 1.322
Table 6: Coalition scenarios: additional SO2 pollution reduction (Kt) during 2020-2015
country LDSF LDF LDS LFS DFS
Denmark 0.700 1.160 1.290 0 1.288
Finland 2.123 1.199 0 1.267 1.214
Latvia 1.282 0.669 0.576 0.689 0
Sweden 1.322 0 1.754 1.794 1.963
SUMMA 5.428 3.027 3.620 3.751 4.465
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Figure 9: Comparison of BAU, HighT and Coalition scenarios: SO2 reduction during
2020-2015, Kt
• LDSF= Latvia+Denmark+Sweden+Finland;
• LDF= Latvia+Denmark+Finland;
• LDS= Latvia+Denmark+Sweden;
• LFS= Latvia+Finland+Sweden;
• DFS= Denmark+Sweden+Finland.
Bigger coalition LDSF delivers higher SO2 reduction and thus more preferable from
environmental point of view. Payoﬀs of all 25 EU countries in case of the Coalition
scenario are presented in Fig. 10 and 11. First of all it is important to point out that
Coalition scenario is proﬁtable for all EU member states (it increases their payoﬀs in
comparison to BAU) and that neighboring countries, Estonia and Lithuania, experience
strong positive externality. Secondly, it reveals that there is potential free-riding problem:
internal stability condition (12) holds for Denmark and Sweden , Finland and Latvia
have incentives to leave the coalition. To get rid of free-riding, a transfer scheme can be
introduced to act as a ’carrot’ mechanism by reallocating the coalition surplus and provide
potential coalition stability.
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Figure 10: Payoﬀs in Coalition scenarios during 2020-2015 (Mln. E)
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Figure 11: Payoﬀs in Coalition scenarios during 2020-2015 (Mln. E)
6 Concluding Remarks
Air pollution of sulphur dioxide (SO2) in the European Union (EU) is a central issue of
the present paper. This problem has a transboundary nature, since emitted air pollution
is transported by winds across the borders and, when acidic pollution is ﬁnally deposited,
its environmental impacts are felt in areas far removed from their sources.
In the present paper we address and analyze the following problems: (1) quantiﬁca-
tion of the geo-physical impact of acidiﬁcation, introduction of cost/beneﬁt parameters;
(2) calibration of technology cost and environmental beneﬁt functions, establishing of an
ecology-economy model; (3) formation of an international environmental agreement on
acid rain among a group of the EU countries; (4) economical and environmental assess-
ment of diﬀerent strategic scenarios available to EU member states.
Stepwise solution of these 4 tasks allows us to derive new policy-relevant conclusions
about available pollution control strategies, regarding the Business-as-usual, High Technol-
ogy and Coalition scenarios. To extend and improve numerical assessment of the pollution
control scenarios, further extension of the present analysis can be suggested
• generalize ecology-economy model by introducing NH3 and NOx pollutant ﬂows into
consideration;
–20 –
• undertake sensitivity analysis of λi, i = 1, . . . , N (and assess heterogeneity of pro-
portionality coeﬃcients xi);
• introduce alternative beneﬁt curve assessment: using statistical data of GDP and
amounts of emitted pollutants of the EUmember states, build a mathematical model,
which expresses a particular functional dependence of access of relative growth of
GDP (growth speed of GDP) on relative emission (emission per unit of GDP);
• develop advanced game theoretic framework of the Coalition scenario: consider other
optimality principles (i.e., Stackelberg, Nash equilibrium) and construct set of stable
agreements basing the self-enforcing principle, detect possible threats for agreement
stability and introduce incentive mechanisms (carrots) and sharing rules to eliminate
free-riding incentives.
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